SUPER1ofc!!

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CE~~tt.NTY ~~ 8~_.f~~ORNIA

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

L JUSTICE CENTER

AUG - 4 2014

COUNTY OF ORANGE, CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER

AlANCARLSO
BAE
N. Clerk of the Court

av:

NDARAAa

.DEPU7Y

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

12ZF0128

scon DEKRAAI,

RULING
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
This court has heard extensive testimony, and examined an abundance of exhibits wh ich run
into the thousands of pages, to resolve allegations of misconduct lodged by the defendant against
members of the Orange County District Attorney's staff and their law enforcement agents in this case.
In a series of independent motions considered concurrently by the court, the defendant seeks 1) an
order barring the People from pursuing the death penalty against him; 2) recusal of the entire Office of
the Orange County District At torney from further involvement in this prosecution; and 3) an order
barring use of statements allegedly made by the defendant after his arrest while he was incarcerated in
the Orange County Jai l.
The legal basis for the defendant's motions can be found in cases such as United States v. Russell
{1973) 411 U.S. 423, in which the United States Supreme Court "recognized that due process may bar a
conviction where the government involvement in a criminal enterprise has become sufficiently
outrageous and shocking to the universal sense of justice." This principle has been applied by
California's courts in numerous cases including Morrow v. Superior Court {1994) 30 Cal. App. 4th and
People v. Smith {2003) 31Cal4th 1207. In People v. Mcintyre (1979) 23 Cal. 3d 742, our Supreme Court
observed that "(s)ufficiently gross police misconduct could conceivably lead to a finding that conviction
of the accused would violate his constitutional right to due process of law". 23 Cal. 3d at 748, Footnote
1.

That having been said, this court is mindful of its current responsibility which is to rule on the
motions pending in this case, People v. Scott Dekraai. The broad scope of the recent evidentiary hearing
related to t hese motions in no way alters that responsibility. This court has heard and considered
evidence that may at times have seemed factually unrelated to this case. The court has engaged in this

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process to provide itself with the perspective necessary to determine whether or not the alleged
activities which are at issue in this case were part of an ongoing course of misconduct by law
enforcement that rises to the level of "outrageous government conduct" as alleged by the defendant;
and also to determine whether or not there is a legal basis for the requested recusal of the entire Office
of the District Attorney.
It is not the appropriate function of this court at this time to attempt to fashion a global remedy
related to all of the prosecutorial misconduct issues raised by the evidence it has heard. Rather, this
court has ultimately focused on these questions:
1)

Did law enforcement engage in misconduct in its investigation and preparation of the case
against this defendant?

2)

If so, what is the nature of that misconduct?

3)

If there was identifiable misconduct, is the imposition of any sanction appropriate?

4) If so, what sanction?

With these questions in mind this court now undertakes its analysis of the evidence presented and the
applicable law as to each pending motion.
1) MOTION FOR SANCTIONS RELATED TO ALLEGED "OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENT CONDUCT"
The defendant's "outrageous government conduct" allegations, and the evidence presented during
the course of this hearing relevant to that issue, relate largely, although not exclusively, to alleged
discovery abuse, much of it dealing with material that may fall within the purview of Brady v. Maryland
(1963) 373 U.S. 83; and post arrest law enforcement activities that allegedly violated standards set forth
in Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201 . Members of the District Attorney's staff, in their
testimony before this court and during final arguments, have acknowledged that Brady violations, or
" errors," may have occurred in a number of recent prosecutions, including this one, but point to several
factors to mitigate their failures: 1) a lack of understanding of relevant lega l gu idelines concerning
criminal case discovery; 2) heavy caseloads; 3) the "deliberate withholding" (to paraphrase the
testimony of one prosecutor) of relevant material by an Assistant United States Attorney; and 4) an
inability to foresee the specific issues raised in the pending defense motions.
This court is convinced that caseloads are heavy for all government lawyers, no matter which end of
the counsel table they occupy. The court also acknowledges that discovery issues can become
complicated, especially when lawyers are busy and cases involve large quantities of discoverable
material, although the basic legal rules applicable to this motion are well established and relatively
straightforward. Finally, the court believes that certain federal authorities may at times relevant to
these proceedings have been arrogant and even dismissive in their dealings with local prosecutors
despite the fact that federal law enforcement traditionally relies on state courts and local prosecutors to
do most of the heavy lifting with respect to the daily operation of America's criminal justice system.
These observations notwithstanding, this court has been unable to locate any authority, and counsel
has cited none, which forgives or excuses a prosecutor's failure to comply with constitutional mandates

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due to a lack of government resources. Nor has the court found any precedent, and again counsel has
cited none, which suggests that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would justify or excuse a lack
of compliance. Finally, this court believes and finds that any failure by federal authorities to act in a
manner consistent with the laws of this state provides no excuse for any local prosecutor's violation of
the Massiah rules or failure to provide to the defense so-called Brady material on a timely basis.
Brady v. Maryland, supra, and Massiah v. United States, supra, are landmark decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. They serve as the bases for fundamental procedural principles which apply to all
criminal cases. They do not embody judicial suggestions. These cases have created self-executing rules
of Constitutional law that must be recognized and followed in every instance by all prosecutors on both
the national and local levels. The Brady rule can be simply summarized. Prosecutors must, even in the
absence of any request by the defendant, turn over to the defense all materia ls which either hurt their
case or help the defendant's cause.
California's Supreme Court has long been sensitive to the im portance of the discovery process in
crimina l cases. Over twenty years ago, in In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 122, the Court offered these
observations:
" ... timely pretrial disclosure of all relevant and reasonably accessible information, to the extent
constitutionally permitted,

facili~ates

'the true purpose of a criminal trial, the ascertainment of the

facts'. (Citation omitted)" 5 Cal. 4th at 131

Five years later, in In re Brown (1998) 17 Cal. 4th 873, the Supreme Court provided the philosophical
basis for its application of the Brady discovery rules to all criminal prosecutions conducted within this
state:
"Despite any seeming unfairness to the prosecution, no other result would satisfy due process in
this context. 'The principle is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance
of an unfair trial to the accused.' (Citation omitted) ... As one court has expressed it: 'We suspect the
courts' willingness to insist on an affirmative duty of inquiry may stem primari ly from a sense that
inaccurate convictions based on government failure to turn over an easily turned rock is essentially
as offensive as one based on government non-disclosure. (Citation omitted) ...This obligation serves
'to justify trust in the prosecutor as 'the representative ... of a sovereignty ... whose interest...in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.' (Citation
omitted)." 17 Cal.4th at 882-83.
Although it hardly seemed necessary, seven years later In People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 1031,
the Supreme Court further explained to California prosecutors their Brady obligations:
"In Brady, the United States Supreme court held 'that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.'
(Citation omitted). The high court has since held that the duty to disclose such evidence exists even
though there has been no request by the accused (citation omitted), that the duty encompasses

3.

impeachmen t evidence as well as exculpatory evidence (citation omitted), and that the duty
extends even to evidence known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor (citation
omitted) ... ln order to comply with Brady, therefore, 'the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of
any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the
police.' "35 Cal. 4th at page 1042.
As suggested above, these rules are not complicated. The prosecutors called to testify in this matter
are among the most experienced lawyers in the Orange County District Attorney's office. They
acknowledged at least a general familiarity with the Brady and Massiah rules. Indeed, the Orange
County District Attorney's own training materials, portions of which have been produced as exhibits
during the current hearing, reinforce the critical importance of Brady compliance in these unambiguous
terms:
" Brady material must be disclosed to the defense whether it is requested or not... The prosecutor is
required to disclose Brady material that is possessed by the prosecution team. The prosecution includes
'both investigative and prosecutorial personnel' .. .Moreover, 'the individual prosecutor has a duty to
learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf, including the
police' ... Court decisions have stern ly imposed this obligation holding the prosecutor responsible for
information in the possession of the 'prosecution team,' whether or not he was actually aware of it. The
fact that a witness WAS an informant in the past has been held to constitute Brady material." (Emphasis
in original) (Citations omitted) Hearing Exhibit A-77, Orange County District Attorney Informant Policy,
January 2012, Rules and Guidelines.
"Brady material must be disclosed whether it is requested or not. The prosecutor is chargeable with
the knowledge of all Brady material in possession of the prosecution team, whether or not he actually
knows of its existence. The prosecution team includes all law enforcement personnel and agencies
assisting the prosecution of the case. The prosecutor thus has the duty of seeking out and disclosing all
material in the possession of the prosecution team. This duty of the prosecutor cannot be delegated to
another." (Emphasis in origina l) Hearing Exhibit A-83, "Written policies of OCDA regard ing Brady
obligations."
This court believes that the discovery rules arising out of Brady are clear and unequivocal. With that
in mind this court finds that substantial evidence supports a number of the defendant's allegations
concerning potential Brady vio lations. For example, one experienced prosecutor whose allegedly chronic
lack of Brady compliance was a major point of contention during this hearing, acknowledged during his
lengthy testimony that he had provided differing amounts of informant related Brady discovery material
to different lawyers on different cases (though not this case), all of which involved the same informant.
In explaining his consistently inconsistent discovery performance this veteran prosecutor described his
typical practice. Shortly before trial he would request any outstanding Brady material from law
enforcement. He would then pass along to his paralegal assistant any material he received in response
to this request without reviewing it. His paralegal would then provide it to defense counsel. As a result
of this "hands off" process, this senior DDA testified that he never noticed that on one case he had
provided four pages of Brady discovery while on another, involving the very same informant, he

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provided one hundred ninety six pages. Such a cavalier attitude toward the constitutionally required
Brady procedure is patently inappropriate and lega lly inadequate.
This court notes that certain issues raised by the defendant's motions require a cross over legal
analysis. Specifically, in certain instances alleged misconduct implicated both Brady and Massiah
standards. With that in mind, this court finds that working informants and targeted inmates were at
times intentionally moved inside the Orange County Jail by jail staff, ofte n at the request of outside law
enforcement agencies, in the hope that inmates would make incriminating statements to those
informants. Such intentional movements were seldom, if ever, documented by any member of law
enforcement. Therefore little or no info rmation concerning these intentional movements was ever
created or turned over to defense counsel as part of the discovery process. This court also finds that
false documentation was requested by, and likely provided to, jail informants to enable them to increase
their credibility with target inmates. All of these activities should, in light of In re Neely (1993) 6 Cal.

4th

901, have been disclosed to defense counsel pursuant to Brady in order to facilitate a defendant's
investigation of possible Massiah violations.
This court also finds that, despite their testimony to the contrary, express or implied promises were
made to both of the informants whose conduct is here at issue and from whom this court heard
extensive testimony. It is clear that both Fernando Perez and Oscar Mariel sought and expected
consideration for their in custody informant work and they were each directly or impliedly promised by
law enforcement that such conside ration would be forthcoming. As the District Attorney's own training
materials excerpted above suggest, this is Brady material.
This court further finds that, without legal justification or excuse, in different cases involving the
same informant significantly different quantities of informant related discovery material were turned
over by Orange Cou nty prosecutors to defense counsel. These cases were not directly related to the
Dekraai prosecution . The missing material included dozens, sometimes hundreds, of pages of
handwritten informant notes which summarized incriminating statements allegedly made by targeted
in mates. After considering all of the evidence presented on this subject, this court is not convinced that
these chronic discovery failures were the result of any improper intervention by federal aut horities. The
missing discovery constituted Brady material.
On the other hand, the court finds that a key misconduct allegation related directly to this
defend ant has not been sustained by the evidence. As unlikely as it may seem in light of the foregoing
findings and the healthy skepticism developed by this court over the years related to coincidence and
criminal prosecutions, the court finds it more likely than not that this defendant and informant
Fernando Perez were not housed in neighboring cells in L Mod within the Ora nge County Jail shortly
after the defendant's arrest as a result of a specific plan by law enforcement. Rather, it appears to the
court that their adjacent cell placements in October of 2011 were the result of a confluence of
independe nt events. Specifica lly, the court find s, based on its eva luation of the testimony as well as its
review of the relevant documents admitted, including Exhibits A-57 and A-58, that this defendant was
ordered housed in Mod L soon after he was booked into the jail by a triage nurse employed by the
county's Health Care Agency rather than by any member of law enforcement. Likewise, the court finds

S.

that informant Perez, while apparently awaiting transport to a federal detention facility, had occupied a
cell in Mod L for some weeks before the terrible events of October 12, 2011 unfolded in Seal Beach.
These findings, however, do not end the court's inquiry in this area. Irrespective of how it came to
pass that this defendant and informant Perez found themselves in adjacent cells within Mod L, it must
still be determined whether or not the defendant's subsequent statements to Perez were the product of
a course of misconduct by members of law enforcement, including the Orange County District Attorney,
which constituted "outrageous government conduct." In fact, the interactions between this defendant
and informant Perez, and later between Perez and law enforcement, in October of 2011 raise a number
of serious questions beyond how the two inmates ended up in adjacent cells.
When prosecutors learned from a Special Handling deputy sheriff soon after the defendant arrived
in Mod L that the defendant was allegedly speaking to Perez about his crimes, and they quickly
thereafter arranged a meeting with both the Special Handling deputy and the informant, they admit that
they had been informed that this inmate "had provided reliable information on prior occasions." So why
did prosecutors not immediately seek more specific information concerning the background of this
mystery inmate? Why did the Special Handling deputy who had known and worked with Perez as an
active informant for many months before the meeting fail to volunteer information to these prosecutors
about the working history of this inmate when, for whatever reason, they failed to ask? Were these
failures a manifestation of a conspiratoria l "don't ask, don't tell" policy, or were they simply the product
of negligence? Ultimately, did the Dekraai prosecution team adequately discharge its constitutional
obligation, as framed in Salazar, supra, "to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on
the government's behalf, including the police?" Did they, as discussed in In re Brown, supra, fail "to turn
over an easily turned rock?"
In answering these questions, the work history of Fernando Perez as an effective informant cannot
be ignored. As a result of his prior instruction and experience, Perez was clearly capable of working
aggressively as an effective custodial informant with very little encouragement or direction. Law
enforcement was well aware of his abilities as he had demonstrated them time and again over the
preceding months. And his motivation to do so was clear as Perez had repeatedly told law enforcement
long before October of 2011 essentially the same thing he related to this court during his recent
testimony--that he would "do anything" to alter his circumstances in order to avoid an impending life
sentence. So when the opportunity fell into his lap to work his informant magic on this defendant who
was suddenly housed in the cell next door, Perez did not hesitate. Within a short time, although he
denied it in his testimony, the evidence indicates that Perez was doing for law enforcement what he had
done so often before-intentionally ingratiating himself with a target suspect and thereafter obtaining
incriminating statements from that suspect.
The People have argued, apparently relying on Neely, supra, that they are not responsible for
Perez's conduct since he was allegedly instructed not to question this charged and represented
defendant about his case, only to listen and report. However, given the factual circumstances
demonstrated by this evidence, this argument is not persuasive. The owner of a starving dog cannot
evade liability for the dog's destructive behavior inside a butcher shop by instructing that dog not to eat

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just before releasing him into the shop knowing at the time that it is teaming with fresh cuts of prime
beef. When released that dog is going to eat. Contrary instruction under such circumstances is
disingenuous and meaningless.
The Neely case does stand for the proposition that the Massiah rules do not apply to an informant
who goes to work "on his or her own initiative, with no official promises, encouragement, or guidance.
(Citation omitted)" However, in Neely the Supreme Court explained how the facts of a particular case
may affect that analysis. "In order for there to be a pre-existing arrangement ... it need not be explicit or
formal, but may be inferred from evidence that the parties behaved as though there was an agreement
between them, following a particular course of conduct over a period of time. (Citation omitted)." 6 Cal.
4th

at 915. So it is here . In this case, there was an historical "course of conduct" between Perez and his

law enforcement handlers which establishes that this informant was in fact once again working on their
behalf when he made inappropriate contact with this defendant. When Perez was "released" near this
defendant's cell inside Mod L, he ate as any starving dog would.
As noted above, prosecutors in their recent test imony have acknowledged that, in hindsight, they
may have violated discovery rules iri this case as well as other recent serious cases. The relevant
questions then become, in light of the allegations made in the defendant's motions, what is the nature
of the misconduct that occurred here? And more specifically, did the misconduct in this case result from
prosecutorial negligence, or was it the product of an ongoing course of "outrageous government
conduct"?
This court has considered the totality of th e evidence presented in formulating its answer to these
questions. Documents filed by the defendant in support of the motion initially created a specter of
intentional prosecutorial misconduct. For example, in his initial pleading the defendant highlighted the
fact that early in 2013 the lead prosecutor in this case filed a sworn declaration opposing discovery of
what would prove to be highly probative materia l concerning Fernando Perez. In his decla ration that
prosecutor made this representation:
"OCDA has not given Inmate F (Perez) any lenie ncy or consideration for his efforts on this case,
and-as stated to Inmate Fon October 19-does not intend to give Inmate F any leniency or
consideration in exchange for his efforts on this case."
This sworn statement now appears to have been, if not inaccurate, at least seriously misleading. Was it
intentionally so? This court has carefully reviewed all of the evidence offered on this issue which the
court views as critical to the resolution of the pending motions in that it focuses squarely on the
fundamental integrity of the criminal justice system. If a prosecutor lies to any court on any case the
entire system becomes a potentia l house of cards.
During his testimony, this senior prosecutor explained his thinking in drafting this declaration, and
denied that any aspect of it was intentionally fa lse. This court now finds the testimony of this witness
credible on this subject. The court believes that when he drafted his declaration, this prosecutor was
unaware of who Francisco Perez was and what prior services he had performed for law enforcement.

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However, what he should have known, and what else he should have done before executing such an
unequivocal declaration, are very different questions.
When Francisco Pe rez engaged th is represented defendant in conversat ion in October of 2011,
Perez ha d been, in essence, a professional informant working at the direct ion of law enforcement inside
the Orange County Jail for over one year. He had executed formal informant agreements. He was
without question working in return for anticipated benefits, either express or implied. The exact nature
of those benefits had just not yet been determined (which may still be the case). Any reasonable
exercise of the type of due diligence required of local prosecutors by cases like In re Brown, supra, and
Salazar, supra, in October of 2011 would have revealed these significant facts to them. Had such a
timely due diligence inquiry been conducted, the current hearing might not have been necessary.
,

It is worth reemphasizing at

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t~ i s

po int that when a loca l prosecutor undertakes a stat e prosecution

that is based on an investigation involving federal authorities, t hat local prosecutor assumes full
responsibility for the manner in which that prosecution will be conducted, including compliance with all
statutory and constitutional requirements. This responsibility, to quote the Orange County District
Attorney's own tra ining materials, "cannot be delegated to another." It is professional and it is personal.
A constitutional responsibility such as that created by Brady cannot be voided by any local policy or any
statute, whet her state or federal.
The history of the Office of t he .Ora nge County District Attorney is proud and accomplished. The
events associated with the current hearing do not constitute the District Attorney's finest hour.
Nonetheless, after an exhaustive evaluation of the totality of this record, the court finds that the District
Attorney's well-documented failures in this case, although disappointing, even disheartening, to any
interested member of this community, were negligent rather than malicious. This court also finds that
these prosecutorial "e rrors," as theywere characterized by counsel during argument, constitute
significant negligence and that they therefore rise to the level of misconduct. The court further finds
that the misconduct was the product of woefully inadequate legal train ing along with a lack of
professional ene rgy and stra t egic imagination.
Time and again this court heard prosecutors explain, in so many words, that their fa ilures in this and
other cases were the result of a misunderstanding of the law; or heavy caseloads; or complex
investigations; or orders they received from federal authorities. Many testified, in essence, that they
were "too busy" to give discovery issues the attention they required. None of these explanations
constitutes a legitimate excuse for the failures demonstrated.
As noted above, this cou rt consid ered evidence concerning alleged misconduct in a number of
factually unrelated cases in an effort to determine whether the misconduct in this case was related to or
the product of a broader course of "outrageous government conduct". This court concludes that it was
not. That is not to suggest that this court finds that there was no misconduct in other cases. However,
since this court finds that the apparent misconduct in other cases is not related to the misconduct
committed in this case, the court believes that the unrelated misconduct becomes irrelevant to the
resolution of the pending motions.

In reaching this conclusion, the court is mindful of our local District Court of Appeal's recent opinion
in People v. Guillen (2014) 2014 DJDAP 8933, which involved multiple appe llate claims of "outrageous
government conduct." After thoroughly reviewing the current state of the law in this area, the wellrespected Presiding Justice of that court reached these lega l conclusions which are binding on this court.
"A court's power to dismiss a criminal case for outrageous government conduct arises from the due
process clause of the United States Constitution. (Citation omitted) ... Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals'
cases have described what a high bar defendants who assert outrageous government conduct must
overcome. The remedy is a 'narrow one.'(Citation omitted) ... The rights of the respective parties
here are extremely important ones, namely, defendant's right to a fair trial and the People's right to
prosecute persons believed to be responsible for the commission of serious crimes. (Citation
omitted) ... Those cases where courts have concluded the government's conduct barred prosecution
because it was outrageous have ln.volved situations where the government interfered with a
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel or created, encouraged, and condoned lengthy
un lawful activity ... we conclude the cases we discuss above establish appellants have not established
that the OCSD or the OCDA en~aged in outrageous government conduct that impacted a protected
right and prevented them from receiving a fair trial."
It might be argued that the prbsecutorial misconduct at issue here, including the allegations made
concerning the impropriety associated with documented efforts by a Seal Beach police detective to
secure a waiver from the defendant concerning his mental health records after he was represented by
counsel, encroached on his "protected" Sixth Amendment rights. Although this court finds that this
contact was improper, once again based upon its evaluation of all of the evidence the court finds that
this violation was negligent rather than malicious. In addition, since the mental health records sought
remain under court seal and have thEfrefore never been seen by the People, this court cannot conclude
that this impropriety will prevenf this defendant from receiving a fair trial. This court therefore finds
that neither this nor any of the other prosecutoria l improprieties committed in this case constitute
"outrageous government conduct" as such conduct is defined in Guillen, supra. This court therefore
declines to impose the relief sought by the defendant in his motion, specifically either the dismissal of
the specia l circumstance allegation he has already admitted, or the prohibition of the penalty trial
sought by the People.
The court nonetheless believes that a significant sanction is appropriate as a result of the
misconduct invo lved here. In People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 900, the Supreme Court confirmed that
trial courts retain " broad discretion in determining the appropriate sanction for discovery abuse, and
recognize that sanctions ranging from dismissal to the giving of special jury instructions may be required
in order to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial, particularly when potentially favorable
evidence has been suppressed." 22 Cal. 4th at page 951 With that discretion in mind, this court will be
guided by the o ld maxim that "the punishment should fit the crime," and hold that the appropriate
sanction for the People's failures in this case is the exclusion of all evidence related to their misconduct;
in other words, the exclusion of the defendant's custodial statements for all purposes during a penalty
trial. The court at this time respectfully declines to impose any additional sanctions.

2) MOTION TO RECUSE THE OFFICE OF THE ORANGE COUNTY DISTRICT ATIORNEY

The court incorporates all of its findings made in section one above as if they were again fully set
forth here. Penal Code section 1424 specifies the standards to be applied when a defendant moves to
recuse the District Attorney from a case. The statutory protocol has been followed in this case. People v.
Spaccia (2012) 209 Cal. App. 4th 93 discusses the legal rules that apply to a recusal motion:
"Penal Code section 1424 has been interpreted as providing a two-part test for disqualification.
First, the court must determine whether there is a conflict of interest. Second, the court must
determine whether the conflict is so severe as to disqualify the district attorney from acting.
(Citation omitted)" 209 Cal. App. 4th at 106.
Despite the emotionally charged venting that has occasionally occurred with respect to all of the
defendant's pending motions and the People's response to them, this court finds that the evidence
produced has been insufficient to support a finding in favor of the defendant on either required prong. It
is troubling that throughout this pending litigation additional materials that appear to have been subject
to this court's January, 2013 discovery order have continued to emerge from various sources. On the
other hand, the court is aware that roughly 17,000 pages of discovery have been produced by the
People in response to that order. On balance, this court has not lost confidence that the duly elected
District Attorney of this cou nty has the ability to competently and ethically complete the prosecution of
this serious matter. The motion to recuse the Office of the Orange County District Attorney is therefore
respectfully denied.
3) MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE DEFENDANT'S CUSTODIAL STATEMENTS
Abundant evidence supports the People' decision to concede the so-called Massiah motion and the
court now formally accepts that capitulation. The defense motion to preclude any use, direct or
derivative, during the People's case in chief of the statements allegedly made by this defendant in the
Orange County Jail in October of 2011 is granted. Of course, in light of this court's ruling above on the
defendant's "outrageous government conduct" motion, the Massiah motion is effective ly rendered
moot.

.:

The evidence presented to support the defendant's Massiah motion demonstrated to this court, as
discussed above, that informant Fernando Perez was not intentionally placed in L Mod in the cell
adjacent to this defendant on October 13, 2011, in an attempt to elicit incriminating statements from
him. Nevertheless, the court finds that the People failed in their due diligence obligation to determine
who Fernando Perez was when they soon thereafte r met and entered into an agreement with him. The
evidence establishes that the Peop le failed to make any significant inquiry at th at time into Perez's
criminal history and his pre-existing relationship with law enforcement. Had they undertaken such a
reasonable inquiry on a timely basis, they would have quickly learned, as discussed in Neely, supra, that
Perez had a longstanding relationship with law enforcement as an informant; that he had been working
effectively as an informant inside the Orange County Jail for many months; and that he had every reason
to expect that he would be rewarded for any additional informant work he might do when he was
ultimately sentenced on his potential life imprisonment case.

\0 .

Given his recent work history with law enforcement and his motivation to "do anything" to
improve his legal circumstances, it could hardly be expected by any reasonable person that Fernando
Perez would do anything other than exactly what he did in this case. Seizing an apparently fortuitous
opportunity to add to his informant resume, he almost immediately engaged this defendant in
conversations about his case, asking questions when he felt it was necessary. Perez was not merely "a
listening post." The conduct of this informant violated this defendant's rights under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The defendant's custodial statements to this informant
must therefore be excluded.

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CONCLUSION

Critical cases often generate complicated, convoluted issues. So it is here. The defendant, who has

..

entered gui lty pleas to eight coun'ts of first degree murder and one count of attempted murder, and
admitted the related multiple

mu~d~r special circumstance, has alleged various acts of misconduct by

I, ;pJ

t:',."

the Orange County District Attorney and sworn members of law enforcement and has requested the
!'! :

imposition of specific sanctions.

This court has analyzed all of the evidence presented that relates to any alleged prosecutoria l
misconduct, while at the same time maintaining its focus on what happened to this defendant in this
case. The court has ultimately concentrated much of its energy on determining whether or not the
events in this case were the product of a broader spectrum of misconduct that rose to the level of
"outrageous governmental conduct."
Many of the witnesses who testified during the course of this hearing were credibility challenged.
These witnesses include current and former prosecutors, as well as current and former sworn peace
officers. Some perhaps suffered from ~ failure of recollection . Others undoubtedly lied. In reaching its
conclusions and formulating its findings, this court has resolved all credibility issues in a manner
consistent with its rulings.
Based upon the foregoing findings, this court now answers its own initial questions regarding the
defendant's "outrageous government conduct" motion as follows:
1)

Law enforcement did engage in misconduct in the investigation and preparation of the current
prosecution;

2) The misconduct directly re.lated to this case was negligent and therefore does not rise to the
level of "outrageous gove,rnment conduct";
3) The misconduct was none,theless serious and therefore merits a significant sanction;
4) The appropriate sanction is the exclusion at trial for all purposes, direct or derivative, of all
custodial statements made by this defendant.
With respect to the recusal motion, pursuant to the standards set forth in Pena l Code section 1424,
that motion is respectfully denied. This court is not convinced that the entire Office of the Orange

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County District Attorney has a conflict of interest with respect to further prosecuting this case; nor is the
court convinced that that the evidence demonstrates "a reasonable possibility that the DA's office may
not exercise its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner" in this case in the future. People v.
Connor (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141at148.
Finally, the Massiah motion is granted in effect by stipulation, and as a result the defendant's
custodial statements are excluded.
The court complements all counsel for their preparation and performance during the presentation
of this extraordinary hearing.
Dated:

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~OETHALS
Judge of the Superior Court

12.